Abstract:

The contemporary phase of the youth-led freedom movement in Indian Held Kashmir (IHK) is not confined to the armed rebellion by the Kashmiri youth but is also coupled with a non-violent approach using social media against the atrocities and human rights violations such as systematic torture, rape, extrajudicial killing, and prisoner abuse, by the committed by the Indian armed forces. Victims’ stories have been well-documented and ‘re-packaged for the world community through social media. The freedom movement went through various phases throughout history, and the most recent phase was introduced in 2016 after the brutal killings carried out by the Indian armed forces that included Burhan Muzaffar Wani, a youth-icon and a freedom fighter who used social media as a communication tool. The use of modern communication technologies like social media ensures that the narrative of the people of Kashmir regarding the freedom from the illegal occupation of Kashmir and suppression by Indian security forces would spread all around the world.  This paper applies social movement framing analysis to this contemporary freedom movement in IHK to better understand the ways in which it is being re-defined by activists through exposure and affiliation to other transnational protest movements and re-framed in a manner that stresses the universal applications of contemporary human rights mobilizations

Key Words

Kashmir Issue; Freedom Movement, Social Movements, Social Media, Frames Analysis, Media Framing

Introduction

The freedom movement in Kashmir can be dated back to the 1930s when the region was under the control of the British Empire.  After the partition of the Subcontinent in 1947, Kashmir, a region with a Muslim majority, was annexed to India against the aspirations of the people. Burhan Wani, who was part of Hizbul Mujahideen, an armed rebellion group, became a youth icon and used social media to raise his voice against the illegal occupation of Kashmir. He shared posts on Facebook, which is one of the most popular social media platforms, with his pictures and recorded video messages to show the world atrocities being committed by the local police and the Indian armed forces in Kashmir. The social media posts he shared got viral, and thousands of viewers from around the globe were able to see the situation in Kashmir. Burhan Wani was killed by the Indian forces, and soon after his death, a new wave of protests by the young boys and girls spread across Kashmir and the situation got intensified when the pictures of his dead body became viral on social media (BBC News, 2016). It compelled the Indian security forces to enforce a curfew and suspend the communication channels like the internet and telephone service. The killing of Burhan Wani had a substantial impact on the contemporary freedom movement in Kashmir, and the use of innovative tools like social media has also strengthened the freedom movement in Kashmir, which is the most militarized zone in the world with estimated troop levels of around 700,000.

The freedom struggle of the people of Kashmir dates back to the time when the Indian Subcontinent itself was under-going through a political movement seeking independence from the British empire. As the territory of Kashmir was governed by a Hindu ruler, a rift between the Muslims who were in the majority and the Maharaja who was Hindu became inevitable. In the late 1930s,  there were several instances that caused government meddling in the people's religious affairs. Indian National Congress and All India Muslim League were the two significant political parties of the Indian Subcontinent that had different spheres of influence, but due to deep religious, cultural, historical and geographical ties, the majority of the Muslims supported All-India Muslim League. The Boundary Commission, headed by Cyril Jean Radcliffe, however, divided Gurdaspur, which was the district of Punjab between Pakistan and India, with a deliberate attempt to provide India with geographical links to the Kashmir valley (Wolpert, 2009).

Meanwhile, the people of Kashmir began to protest the dictatorial and repressive government of Maharaja. Just after the partition of British India, the newly formed states Pakistan and India engaged in a war over Kashmir in 1948. The ceasefire split Kashmir between Pakistan and India. During the war of 1948, the Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir signed a contentious accession agreement with the government of India. The war ended with a United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) resolution granting Kashmiris the “right of self-determination”, but later, India denied the people of Kashmir their legitimate right promised to them by UNSC.  Earlier, during Srinagar's visit, M. K. C. Gandhi, leader of the Indian National Congress, had claimed that the will of the people of Kashmir is the paramount law in Jammu and Kashmir (Faisal, 2014). Similarly, in his speeches, letters and telegrams, former Indian Premier Jawaharlal Nehru consistently expressed his commitment to Kashmiris “right to self-determination” and his commitment to resolving the Kashmir issue in accordance with the will of the people of Kashmir.

In accordance with Article 370 of its Constitution, India granted Kashmir a unique status, but eventually, several of its sections were altered, and in 2019 the Article 370 was revoked to suppress the Kashmiris. The tensions between Pakistan and India resulted in two major wars in 1965 and 1971 and several other minor skirmishes. In 1971, Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi and then chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah, signed an agreement 1974 to fully integrate Kashmir into India (Bose, 2004).

In 1987, elections were held in Indian held Kashmir, and the Indian authorities manipulated the elections to the extent that it fueled the armed resistance by the freedom fighters. The leaders who were also leading the uprising movement in IHK participated in elections. These included Syed Ali Geelani, who was heading “All Parties Hurriyat Conference” (APHC), Syed Salahuddin, the chief of the popular “Hizbul Mujahideen” (HM), Yaseen Malik, who led the “Liberation Front”. Several Muslim contestants were declared as terrorists by the Indian establishment, and the large-scale manipulation of the elections paved the way for further demonstrations and armed rebellion by the Kashmiris that continued throughout the 1990s. The event of 9/11 negatively affected the freedom struggle in IHK and compelled the freedom fighters to go for a political solution instead. Nevertheless, a new wave of demonstrations arose in 2007-2008 over the dispute surrounding “Amarnath Yatra”, which was caused by the Indian government's intent to move some eight hundred kanals of forest land to the shrine board (Hindustan Times, 2008). The most recent upsurge of protests begun in the aftermath of the brutal slaying of Burhan Muzafar Wani, who was the district commander of Hizbul Mujahedeen (HM), which is the most significant indigenous resistance groups by the Indian security forces.

Framing Identities

In order to place this study within the context of social movement framings, it is first important to understand what role ethnic, national, and religious identity markers may have on actors’ motivations to participate in the transnational Kashmiri freedom movement. It is a feature of identity politics for political entrepreneurs to garner support for a cause and mobilize constituents by appealing to a particular identity, be that an ethnic, religious, national, linguistic, professional, gender, sexual orientation or any other set of identities. The emergence and sustenance of social movements have been analyzed with respect to their mobilizing structures, political opportunities, and framing processes. McDonald reviews the growing importance of identity in the study of social movements by the mid-1980s by expressing how ‘Identity increasingly became understood as a resource that could be mobilized…or a factor that reduced the costs of mobilization…’ (McDonald, 2006:26). Here there is somewhat of a connection between ideology as an abstract concept and identity as a tangible resource. Furthermore, identity is the way in which movements could ‘transform their members into political actors’ (Taylor et al. 1995: 104). 

Growing research on identity politics led to an increasing discussion of the role of collective identities being used as a political resource (McDonald, 2006: 26). Politicizing identities implies that identities are socially constructed, and therefore able to be changed. Ideological processes may present a clear picture of the complexities surrounding the transmission of political ideas, how constituents relate to a campaign, how particular identities become salient and may lead to supporting a particular political cause or candidate, etc. However, there seems an almost inescapable line of thought in the literature that relies quite heavily on stereotypical imaginings of an ‘other.’ In conflict resolution terms, ‘characterization frame’ is a frame used to undermine the legitimacy of others, ‘cast doubts on their motivations, or exploit their sensitivity,’ (Kaufman et al., 2015: 3). An example here would be the labelling of a group as ‘terrorists.’ It is a highly negative and contentious term describing a group that most probably does not see itself in that perspective. Without an open space for dialogue, classification frames in news and academic discourse, and perpetuated on social media platforms, can further escalate conflicts by widening the discursive space between opponents. Frames can play a very strategic role in the escalation, de-escalation and overall intractability of a conflict. Again, this can be a conscious effort by political entrepreneurs, or it may be a consequence of years of media framing, state and non-state rhetoric and propaganda, or even played out in popular culture references. 

Although many studies have been conducted in order to examine the news on Kashmir, there is a void in terms of the focus from the perspective of the Kashmiri freedom activists, their interpretation of the events, and how do they frame their grievances, in addition to the analysis of the other actors involved, their goals, and their identities. It is evident that the contemporary Kashmir freedom movement is transnational. 

Analyzing separatist movements as social movements is not novel but are particularly evident in the contemporary context of transnational student and youth-driven movements. The youth who assemble abroad reflect the youths on the streets in their respective locations, shouting slogans, waving placards, and throwing stones. But how does one reconcile identity-related claims inherent in a movement for one’s own homeland with the desire to collectively mobilize diverse populations? How do they perceive the movement for themselves as Kashmiri activists, and how do they alternatively ‘sell’ the movement to a wider audience on social media in an effort to turn their domestic transgressions into a meaningful transnational call to action?

Kashmir Freedom Movement and Traditional Media

The Kashmir Freedom Movement is an indigenous struggle of the Kashmiris to get rid of the illegitimate Indian occupation. The movement is being suppressed by the Indian armed forces, and thus, the killings and the violation of human rights is not being reported on the mainstream print and electronic media of India. However, the people of Kashmir have never let the freedom movement come to a standstill. They have used alternative modes of communication like speeches at the places of gatherings, distributing the pamphlets, wall chalking and publishing and circulating local newspapers. In recent years, the use of social media has also been used as a medium for communication by the Kashmiri freedom fighters. 

In 1987, when elections were held in IHK, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) leaders accused the Indian administration of massive rigging, but the mainstream media of India used the negative framing and became mouth-piece of the Indian establishment and a tool of propaganda with one-sided framing. Similarly, the coverage of the news by the leading newspapers of India has projected the narrative of the Indian State (Joseph, 2000). The content is published by the electronic and print media in IHK is “vigorously government-led” and severely “negative” (Sreedharan, 2009). The media coverage given to the freedom movement in Kashmir was “ethnocentric” and based on state-controlled sources. The Indian conventional media is biased, sensational and antagonistic and does not cover the freedom struggle and sufferings of the Kashmiris (Naik, 2016). The local media in IHK is bound to adhere to Delhi's laws and regulations that also regulates the accreditation and puts checks on the funds and advertising revenues that are essential for the existence of any newspaper. The Indian government also uses this control to keep the media in the IHK under close control. Press freedom is always suppressed, and every news item must be strictly censored according to Indian standards. If there is any news about the role of the military or any commentary on the Indian forces, the spokesperson of the fifteenth corps in Srinagar does not let it publish.

The private media in IHK is also under strict scrutiny. Any criticism against the government leads to serious consequences. There have been numerous instances of the killing of the journalists like the freelance reporter, Ghulam Mohammad Lone, who got killed by ‘masked gunmen’ in August 1994 as reported (Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), 1994). Another similar incident took place in April 1996 when the editor of the newspaper, Rehnuma-e-Kashmir, Ghulam  Rasool Sheikh, got killed (CPJ, 1996).

There is a restricted international media presence in IHK; nonetheless, several media organizations continue to operate outside of Kashmir valley. The world media like BBC and the Voice of America (VOA) also have limited access to areas of instability so that the journalists may not highlight the atrocities being committed by the Indian security forces. Instead, they generally depend on official news outlets or press communications produced by the rebellious groups. The Pakistani electronic and print media do not have direct access to IHK, nor do they have a reporter there (Waleed Rasool & Khan, 2016).

The quantitative analysis of the news of the Indian media shows that 78% of the content is related to the Indian military (Tarfe, 2015). The impact of the inability of the traditional media to cover the Kashmir freedom movement paved the way for social media as an alternate mode of communication.




Kashmiri Freedom Movement; A Transnational Mobilization?

In response to the revocation of lands to the Amarnath Yatra shrine board in 2008, Kashmiris staged massive protests, marches, and strikes. Further debilitating the Kashmir Valley were the imposition of curfews and blockades, blocking essential commodities from being freighted into the Valley. The protests were met with brutal force by the Indian security forces. In addition to calls for Azadi, or freedom, the protesters shouted slogans in praise of Pakistan and overtook the main square in Srinagar in order to hoist the Pakistani flag (Roy, 2011).

Symbols must extend beyond the scope of a singular community in order to reach out to an international or transnational audience. Oleson refers to Gamson and Lasch’s concept of metal packaging, which, in general, consists of a package of ‘idea elements with potential applicability to a wide range of issues’ (Oleson, 2009: 5). This certainly seems to be a succinct way to conceptualize the human rights frame as advocated by so many transnational groups. In order for a movement to transcend the domestic realm to become transnationally relevant, it is necessary to re-package group goals in a manner more relatable to a wider audience (Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005). Oleson’s work describes how activists may develop a ‘solidaristic meta package’ based on the presence of particular frames rooted in human rights-related activism (Oleson, 2009: 9). These interpretative packages have a more universalistic character which translates to a wider group being able to empathize or create bonds with the target group. Recent work in other contemporary movements has noted the transformation of separatist or freedom movements into transnational social movements. One such case also looks to framing analysis using Twitter to understand support for the Palestine Solidarity Movement in Ireland and the UK (Abu-Ayyash, 2014). The Palestinian movement for self-determination has become much better known and publicized in recent years and demonstrates the heterogeneity and appeal the movement has for non-Palestinians, non-Arabs, and non-Muslims. A thorough analysis of key activist Twitter accounts reveals that the most frequent way to discuss the Palestinian movement is to discuss it in a human rights frame. It can be demonstrated through analysis of the types of articles shared and the comments made on the article. The human rights frame in this scenario would be the potential ability to mobilize people to action – or at least to publicly demonstrate support for the Palestinian cause. This analysis may not be accurate, but it is a great starting point in understanding motivations for slacktivism.

As is often the case, however, and is argued in social movement literature, simply being opposed to human rights abuses is not enough to promote action. In social movement terminology, the prognosis is that the Palestinian people are suffering, and the diagnosis is a free and independent Palestine. The motivation for action, it would appear, is having empathy for the people suffering human rights abuses and the want to fix it. However, this represents a very small engagement with much broader literature (Polletta et al., 2001). Countless other social movement scholars appreciate that the call to collective action is a constant push and pull between collective and individual identities – which are malleable and salient. This makes it very difficult to make any generalizable assumptions or typologies of SMOs; however, the breadth of work on the subject does offer hope in uncovering particular trends, such as understanding better the frames used by social movement organizers (McAdam et al., 1996). The reasoning for activists mobilizing always contains some subjective component (Noakes et al., 2005).

Although in-group activists share some common ethnic or regionally ethnic identity (Kashmiri or other South Asian), out-group activists tend to share a subjective bond based on their own experience of perceived subjugation or oppression. For others still, it is their dedication to working with or perhaps a general or academic interest in disadvantaged minorities or victims of torture or human rights abuse.

The use of pellet guns by the Indian armed forces has intensified the suffering of the Kashmiri people, and while it got viral on the social media platforms, the human rights frame suggests that the reason for these violations in Kashmir is due to an illegal  ‘occupation’ by ‘India.’ Viewed in this perspective, it is easy to make a tenuous link between movements in opposition to perceived ‘colonialism’ or ‘imperialism.’ It could be noted, however, that the ‘Kashmiri’ is a separate entity from the ‘Indian.’ In this sense, the Kashmiri is occupied, and the Indian is the occupying force could suggest an ethnic movement; however, the Kashmir identity has developed as a result of shared experiences of suffering; in relation to torture, human rights violations, and rape being used as a weapon of war (Cockell, 2000). A movement being in opposition to torture, human rights violations, and rape being used as a weapon of war is indeed not a hugely controversial concept. It serves as a universal rallying point that others, especially other activists, can get behind. 

There is express disillusionment with political processes in and regarding Kashmir. There is historical precedence for disillusionment. Election rigging and the dismissal of elected officials in the state have been well-documented affairs (Akbar, 1985; Schofield, 2010; Bose, 2005). Fighting the system from a grassroots perspective has gained traction in the activist communities within and out with Kashmir. The role identities play in gaining sympathy from an international audience and the role they have in recruiting more members also plays a role. Perhaps most meaningful is how traditional identity markers such as nationalism and religion have given way to social values identities such as human rights and women’s rights, leading to more rhetorically universalist calls for democratic and legal reforms. 

Kashmir Freedom Movement and the Social Media

Until 2014, Kashmiris were denied the right to use the internet by the Indian government, unlike citizens in many other regions of the world. In 2014, consumers could only get restricted access to social media websites via the official internet. It wasn't until 2015, when 3G and 4G mobile networks were introduced in Kashmir that social media began to act as a catalyst for cultural connectedness.

People of Kashmir who were marginalized by mainstream media turned to social media to connect with one another. The conversation also highlighted the aggression and atrocities committed by the Indian forces, as well as India's illegitimate annexation of Kashmir. Previously, Indian military forces stationed in Kashmir rigged the state assembly elections in 1987 by tightly controlling information entering and leaving the region. For the objectives of information management, Radio Kashmir was the principal weapon. The results of the elections were stolen from the Muslim United Front's (MUF) victorious candidates and announced on Radio Kashmir. The MUF candidates and supporters were also detained.  Within two years after the declaration of the concocted elections against the MUF, the indigenous political struggle transformed into armed rebellion. This not only shattered Kashmiris' faith in Indian official institutions but also put an end to all hopes of accurate reporting by Indian media. Because of the negative role played by the state-controlled media in IHK in the years that followed, a vacuum was created, and Kashmiris' voices were silenced. The people of Kashmir for decades had very limited access to print and electronic media for raising their voice against the oppression.  This vacuum was filled by the rise of social media in Kashmir, which was a sigh of relief for the people of Kashmir.

As 3G and 4G technologies became more widely available, social media became a venue for providing information to and from IHK, filling a gap. This aided the creation of a new wave of the movement against Indian oppression. Social media also gave the Kashmiri struggle a much-needed domestic perspective, thereby undermining India's image of the freedom movement as being funded by Pakistan. Because young people are the key social media users, it has changed the entire landscape of society. A report made by Khalid (2016) in the aftermath of the floods in Kashmir can be used to measure the Indian army's influence over the news related to Kashmir. The analysis demonstrates how the Indian media consistently promotes the Indian military-centric perspective on IHK while demonizing Kashmir's independence movement. Consequently, Kashmiris are getting more and more dependent on social. In 2016, there were twenty-two such instances where the internet service was completely disrupted in order to suppress the Kashmiri resistance movement. India saw more internet outages than Syria, Turkey, or Iraq. The conflict in Kashmir has been substantially influenced by social media, which has increased public awareness of the situation on the ground. Because the traditional media failed, social media has gained much significance among the Kashmiris.

In a 2016 report, Amnesty International voiced grave concerns about the internet shutdown in IHK (Saha, 2006). 

The pictures and video clips of the killings by the security forces in IHK, when posted to social media, depicted a scenario opposite to the one being portrayed by the Indian media by distorted pictures and details manipulated. Social media has helped its Kashmiri users get their message across quickly because it is free from editing barriers. “Imaging and framing” through social media are inexpensive, instantaneous and easily available to the people of Kashmir who are the aspirant to independence. Social media also allowed the content to reach the global audience from the isolated areas where traditional media had little coverage or where access to the traditional media was intentionally blocked, or the content was subject to strict ‘regulatory compliance’. The pictures uploaded by the 22-year-old Burhan Wani on Facebook with a Kalashnikov initiated a peculiar trend in the resistance against India. It established Burhan Wani's massive following on social media, and he became a youth icon. Most of his followers were also young and educated Kashmiris (Rasool et al., 2016). Social media gave the indigenous freedom struggle a new life.

Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) gives legal cover to the killings of the freedom

fighters in IHK by the Indian. Indian armed forces also use “sub-conventional operations” with the intention of neutralizing the freedom fighters in IHK. The killing of Burhan Wani also elevated the resistance movement as the pictures of his bullet-ridden perforated dead-body had been posted to Facebook by nearby villagers on the site of the targeted shooting, generating a "magic bullet" impact among Kashmir's social media users and disrupted Indian media's traditional framing.

The pro-establishment traditional Indian media concentrated all the efforts on selling the usually fabricated stories to the world community that the young “freedom-fighter” killed was a "wanted militant" and tried to justify his killing. This time, however, the people of Kashmir were not ready to embrace any concocted storey broadcasted by the state-controlled Indian media, and the perspective of the freedom fighters prevailed. Burhan Wani’s philosophy spread over social media to the Kashmiri people, who considered him a hero.  The daily manoeuvring and “content management” by Indian traditional media in IHK not only backfired after the killing of Burhan Wani but also served to reinforce the feeling of the people opposing Indian oppression. This has also undermined the attempts of the Indian traditional media and the government to pacify the situation. Indian government blocked the internet service and mobile phone networks as an attempt to deprive people of social media. Though the Indian security forces have killed thousands of people since 1989, the protests after the killing of Burhan Wani triggered a long period of resistance and resulted in huge loss of precious human lives and property. The people of Kashmir opposed Wani's characterization of Indian media as a “terrorist” and made it clear that killing “freedom fighters” can no longer be justified by merely branding them as “terrorists.”

The use of social media to highlight the freedom movement in IHK has internationalized the Kashmir issue in support of Kashmiris and against India's vested interests to suppress the freedom struggle. In both the presence and absence of traditional media, social media has now turned out to be a weapon for the freedom fighters in IHK. As a reaction to this, the BJP government used the policy of suppression again. Modi’s government also undermined Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which gave Jammu & Kashmir special status, thus legitimizing the blatant use of force in post-Wani protests.

Plebiscite and the Right to Self-Determination

One of the most common themes across all samples is the framing of the right to self-determination as a human right, which is commonly referenced in international forums such as the United Nations and repeated by activists for self-determination of Kashmir. The most common terminology used in this context is the term ‘plebiscite,’ which has been commonly used in activist literature on Kashmir, in academic literature and encapsulated by the Plebiscite Front, one of the first well-organized non-violent attempts to lobby for the implementation of the UN mandate for a plebiscite. All Kashmiris are familiar with the UN mandate for a plebiscite and regularly approach this as evidence of the right to self-determination and hotly contend that India has denied Kashmir’s rights through not implementing the plebiscite. The link between the right to self-determination and the militarization of Kashmir (often referred to as an occupation) is equally habitual. A desire for justice and scepticism around the likelihood of perpetrators being punished is also commonly expressed. 

Kashmiris seem quite well-disposed to the idea of international intervention in Kashmir. UN has mandated a plebiscite (or referendum) to be held to determine the fate of the Kashmir people. Not giving the people the option to choose has been a big grievance. It is also an argument visited when discussing the Kashmir conflict with that outside of Kashmir. It is assumed that not a lot of people outside of South Asia are familiar with the historical contexts of the UN.

Conclusion

This paper has explored some of the dominant themes in human rights framing of the contemporary transnational freedom movement in Indian Held Kashmir, also known as the Azadi movement, through the traditional and social media contents analysis. Literature on the ethnonational depictions of a Kashmir freedom movement tends to look at a much narrower, homogenized conception of ethnicity and other identity markers. However, the full extent and impact that other movements have, or that other world trends may have on the situation, needs to be considered as well. Social movements do not occur in isolation, and social movement processes can better articulate the contemporary, progressive nature of the Kashmiri freedom movement. 

Raising awareness about Kashmir to an international audience has been a conscious effort, and social media has been used as a new tool of communication as reflected on the corresponding social network sites of the groups. The collaboration efforts with other campaigns and groups, as well as the language used, are reflective of the growing transnationalism of the Kashmiri freedom cause. Social media has undermined the “media management” of the Indian government, taking the freedom movement to a new level. 

Social media has turned out to be a more influential “weapon” than the traditional Kalashnikov allegedly recovered from Burhan Wani, who was killed by the Indian security forces. In the IHK, social media has surpassed all the physical and psychological obstacles created by the state-controlled media and the Indian security forces. On the psychological warfare front in IHK, the Indian armed forces have been struggling hard to maintain their understanding and push the Indian state narrative. Indian security forces' disproportionate use of force backfired and sparked a mass uprising at IHK.  The propaganda by the traditional Indian media failed to depict Burhan Wani as a “terrorist” and justify his killing. Burhan Wani is the new face of the freedom struggle in IHK. He is the first one to use social media to influence the masses and attitudes of the people of Kashmir and the world community. The attempts of the traditional Indian media to frame him as a “terrorist” after the brutal killing by the Indian security forces were failed and dominated by the version of social media. 

Social media is an alternate way of raising the voice more efficiently than deadly weapons, but it also requires traditional media

alliances that can use social media knowledge as their primary subject matter. So, social media can be regarded as a force multiplier and has gained much relevance in the freedom struggle in IHK and in the age of globalization where the boundaries cannot impede information flow, social media has the potential to direct the future of the freedom struggle in IHK and will have a profound impact on the resolution of Kashmir issue.

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